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Ten-through 14-year-old children were presented a complex task designed to 
elicit a variety of memorization strategies. There was a curvilinear relation of age 
and memory performance on the task: 12- and 13-year-olds took many more trials 
to memorize the items than did younger or older children. Subjects reported using 
strategies ranging from attempts at rote memorization through attempts to avoid 
memorization altogether by deriving some systematic understanding of the task. 
Differences in reported strategies were related to age and to differences in mem- 
ory performance. Results are discussed in terms of a general development of the 
use of understanding as a deliberate, indirect memory strategy. 
Whereas much is known about changes in problem solving and reason- 
ing during adolescence (see Neimark, 1975), there has been little study of 
the implication of these changes for memorization strategies. Memoriza- 
tion strategies that have been studied with adolescents seem straightfor- 
ward extensions of concrete operational abilities to classify, seriate, and 
manipulate images of objects (Neimark, 1976: Rohwer, 1973). However, 
one could also expect strategy advances brought about by the formal 
operational child’s new found expertise in understanding systems of vari- 
ables by relating occurrences and nonoccurrences of events to higher order 
principles, propositions, or systems. The present research is concerned 
with a type of memory strategy which qualifies as a candidate here: it 
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seems to require some formal understanding of the relation of instances to 
general principles for its deliberate execution. This strategy can be de- 
scribed as one of foregoing attempts at rote memorization in order to 
“understand” the material, with the expectation that “memory” for par- 
ticular instances will follow automatically from knowledge of the general 
principles (or at least follow with much less rote memorization). Intui- 
tively, this strategy is one employed frequently by adults, partly in order 
to avoid the tedium of memorization more narrowly construed. This 
approach will be referred to as an indirect, understanding strategy. 
In the above description attempts at rote memorization denote strategic 
activities directed at producing an exact copy of the to-be-remembered 
stimuli. These would include activities like rehearsal and grouping which 
produce “episodic memories” (Tulving, 1972) or “memory in the narrow 
sense” (Piaget & Inheider, 1973). Information can also be committed to 
and retrieved from memory not as specifically stored items, but as the 
result of the ongoing meaningful interpretation and understanding of 
events: “semantic memory” (Tulving, 1972) or “memory in the wider 
sense” (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973). These two roughly distinguishable types 
of memory are interwoven in complex ways. Further, the growing child’s 
understanding of his own activities in relation to these types of memory 
must be interwoven at some point in development. 
While it seems clear that some forms of semantic memorization (pro- 
cesses of understanding which also result in storage of information) must 
be present from birth, little is known about the development of strategies 
to enhance these processes (Brown, 1975). The developmental picture for 
rote memorization activities is more fully studied. Preshool children do 
not seem to understand the special mnemonic demands of tasks requiring 
exact rote recall (Appel, Cooper, McCarrel, Sims-Knight, Yussen, & 
Flavell, 1972). Children younger than 6 or 7 do not employ memory 
strategies (especially rehearsal, practicing, grouping) that are designed to 
ensure rote memory. Older children become increasingly proficient at this 
class of memorization techniques (for reviews see Brown, 1975: Chi, 
1976: Kail & Hagen, 1977). We propose a further development. At some 
point after children understand the demands of rote memory tasks and the 
usefulness of rote memory strategies, they must realize that tasks requir- 
ing exact recall do not necessarily have to be met with rote memory 
strategies. Accurate knowledge of a presentation can often be generated 
from some general conceptualization; a person can use semantic under- 
standing processes as a means to rote memory ends. 
If this assumed development occurs, then at certain ages it should be 
possible to demonstrate differences in memory strategies proceeding from 
direct attempts at rote memorization of specific items (use of rehearsal, 
for example, to encode discrete items) to efforts at deliberate memoriza- 
tion which are mdirect, relying on conceiving some system or structure 
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from which specific items can be derived. The present investigation was 
based primarily on this hypothesis. Secondarily, as outlined in the open- 
ing paragraph, we hypothesized that use of such an indirect understanding 
strategy should be temporally related to the attainment of formal opera- 
tions. 
An empirical demonstration of developmental differences in employing 
an indirect understanding strategy seems complicated by a variety of 
factors. Deliberate use of an indirect understanding strategy would de- 
pend on more than just realizing its usefulness. How well a person is able 
to devise a higher-order system and able to appraise the respective efforts 
required in this approach and rote memory approaches would be influen- 
tial. Further, certain item sets do not fend themselves to higher order 
solutions and certain task procedures do not facilitate an exploration for 
general principles. There must also be intricate interrelationships of 
memory in the narrow and wider senses that would obscure performance 
in any concrete situation. The deliberate derivation of a conceptual sys- 
tem often requires (at feast initially) exact memory of some of the items or 
task dimensions; on the other hand, seeking to understand a presentation 
may result in such exposure to the items that they are rote memorized 
anyway. In short, a host of factors must mediate use of an understanding 
strategy, and a full elaboration of the present hypothesis requires a com- 
prehensive theory of strategic behavior, executive monitoring of such 
behavior, and the relation of these to numerous task variables. In advance 
of such a theory, however, a preliminary exploration of the use of under- 
standing to achieve rote memorization seems desirable. 
Finite mathematical structures such as groups with a small number of 
elements have been successfully taught to children (Bruner, 1966: Dienes 
& Jeeves, 1965: Sheppard, 1974). From working primarily with adults, 
Dienes and Jeeves reported that the combinations of elements in small 
groups can be learned with or without an understanding of the underlying 
structures and axioms. For the present study a simplified group task 
embodied in I6 combinations of fights was devised. The child was to learn 
the combinations, and at the two extremes this could be accomplished by 
direct memorization or by comprehending something of the group struc- 
ture of the task. In general, an understanding strategy has the potential 
advantages of being fess tedious, more challenging, and also more 
efficient in the sense that general principles encompassing all the items 
may be devised by studying only a subset of them. Thus, on the present 
task, differences between approaches adopted in order to learn the com- 
binations might be evident on (a) measures of time or trials taken to learn 
the combinations, (b) measures of subjects’ ability to give correct predic- 
tions for items not previously tried, and (c) subjects’ reports of rules, 
systems, or mnemonics used to remember the combinations. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
The 236 children tested were drawn from two primary and two corre- 
sponding secondary school districts in Canberra, Australia. There were 
initially 48 children in each of five age groups, but the data from four 
12-year-olds were discarded because of inaudible tape recordings. Each 
group represented a 6-month age range, with 6-month gaps between 
groups, and each contained approximately equal numbers of boys and 
girls. The five groups were lo-year-aids (aged 9 years, 11 months to 105; 
M = 24, F = 24), 11-year-olds (aged 10,ll to 115; M = 23, F = 25), 
12-year-olds (aged 11,ll to 125; M = 22, F = 22), 13-year-olds (aged 
12,ll to 13,5: M = 24, F = 24), and 14-year-olds (aged 13,ll to 14,5; M = 
24, F = 24). 
Apparatus and Task 
As indicated in the introduction, the choice of task for the present 
research was constrained in a number of ways. The child needed free 
access to the task so that he could adopt his own approach and explore for 
general principles if he wished. Yet the task needed a trial by trial nature 
to provide a running measure of memory. The task had to be difficult so 
that rote memorization would be strained yet engaging so that children 
would persevere in attempting to learn it. Foremost, the task needed to 
be rich enough to result in the use of a range of strategies. A version of 
Dienes and Jeeves’ (1965) cyclic four group task, modified to make the 
apparatus and method of presentation suitable for use with children, was 
devised. 
The child saw two smaller panels of lights and switches, connected to a 
larger display of four colored lights (as shown in Fig. 1). The two smaller 
(35 x 18 cm) panels, and the one larger (45 x 38 cm panel) each had, in a 
left to right row, a yellow (Y), green (G), blue (B), and red (R) light. The 
two smaller panels had one switch below each of the four lights. If a single 
light was switched on in only one of the smaller panels then the same light 
lit up on the small panel and on the larger panel. If a combination of one 
light in each of the smaller panels was on then each light lit up in the small 
panels but a specified resultant light came on in the large panel. Table 1 
shows the resultant large panel light for every combination of lights from 
the two smaller panels. This arrangement of combinations defines a cyclic 
four group (see Dienes & Jeeves, 1965, for further discussion). If the large 
panel’s lights are considered a circle (with Y following R) then each 
combination of one light in either small panel with all the lights in the 
other small panel yields a unique but complete turn around the circle. In 
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addition, all of the group properties hold: closure, an identity element, 
and the commutative, inverse, and associative laws.’ 
The group structure of the task means that there are a number of higher 
order conceptions that can be used to achieve an understanding of the 
combinations of lights. It was this property of the task and not its group 
structure per se that interested us for present purposes. The following two 
systems (as well as others) capture all the combinations: 
Cyclic. The four lights are seen as lying on a circle in clockwise order 
Y,G,B,R. The lights represent the following moves: Y - no move; G - a 
move of one position clockwise; B - a move of two positions clockwise: 
R - a move of three positions clockwise. (Equivalent counter-clockwise 
moves may be substituted for the clockwise moves). 
Numericul. The lights are seen as a group of integers, Y = 0, G = 1, B 
= 2, R = 3. The numbers combine under addition, and any number 
’ Specifically, given a set of elements (Y,G,B,R) and a set of combinations defined in 
Table I, then: (1) Closure: Any combination of two elements aIways results in an element in 
the original set (e.g., G + B = R). (2) Identity element: There is an element, Y, which when 
combined with any second element results in that second element (e.g., Y + R = R). (3) 
Commutative Law: For every combination of any two elements, A + B, then A + B = B + 
A (e.g., G + B = R, and B + G = R). (4) Inverse Law: For each element there is an element 
which when combined with the first results in the identity element (e.g., G + R = Y, B + B 
= Y, etc.). (5) Associative Law: For any three elements (A,B,C), A + (B + C) = (A + B) + 
C (e.g., G + B = R, then R + R = B, so (G+ B) + R = B; also B + R = G, then G + G = B, 
so G + (B + R) = B). 






greater than 3 is equal to the remainder after its division by 4. (Many other 
numerical systems are possible). 
In addition to the above conceptualizations which predict every combi- 
nation, rules could be discovered that would predict some combinations, 
given knowledge of some other(s). Two obvious ones depend on group 
axioms: first the commutative law (for a given combination, e.g., B + R, 
the same outcome results if the lights are reversed in the smaller panels, R 
+ B) and secondly the identity element (the Element Y leaves any ele- 
ment it is combined with unchanged, e.g. Y + B = B). 
Procedures 
In general, the child’s task was to be able to state from memory which 
combinations caused which resultant lights to come on. The child was free 
to learn the task by trying whichever combinations he chose, each tryout 
of a combination defining a trial. In addition, to probe his learning of the 
task, the child was systematically tested on his recall of all the combina- 
tions at periodic intervals. Learning and testing proceeded until criterion 
performance was obtained. 
More specifically, each child, tested individually, was told “This is a 
game with lights: I want you to find out the rules of the game as we play 
it.” One panel was labelled the child’s panel, the other the experimenter’s 
panel. The child was shown that lights switched on in the small panels 
made the lights go on in the big panel. Then the child was told “The game 
is to find out the rules which tell you which light goes on in the big panel 
when one in your panel and one in mine are put together like this” 
(experimenter demonstrates). The child was shown that he was free to try 
out whichever combinations he wished, then told “When you can tell 
which light is going to come on in the big panel for all the combinations in 
the small panels the game will be finished.” In trying the lights the child 
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was required to predict the outcome of any combination in advance of 
seeing it. This gave a trial by trial index of his progress on the task. 
Each child was encouraged to try the combinations as many or as few 
times and in whatever order he deemed best. This freedom meant the 
child would not necessarily try all the combinations: therefore the running 
records do not provide a complete picture of a child’s knowledge. To have 
a comprehensive measure of knowledge of the task each child was tested 
periodically on all the combinations. Rather than test a child’s predictions 
in a random order (possibly confusing those children with a systematic 
approach to the task) predictions were tested in order l-16 in Table 1. 
This meant that the periodic testing could structure the task for the child. 
Thus it was important (a) to conduct the tests late in learning (so as not to 
interfere with early self devised strategies), and (b) to test each child when 
he had learned a given number of combinations (so no child’s learning 
would be enhanced or constrained merely by a late or early test). Our goal 
was to first test each child at that point where he had learned about 10 of 
the pairs. Pilot results suggested that a child first be tested at whichever of 
the following events occurred first: (1) the child said he knew all the 
combinations (usually happening only late in learning), (2) he had worked 
on the task for 25 min, or (3) it was clear from the running records that the 
child probably knew eight combinations (the chief index being repeated 
successes on some combinations). Second and third tests. if needed, were 
provided (1) when the child said he was ready or (2) after 15 min of 
learning attempts, whichever occurred first. No child required more than 
three tests. 
Each child continued in the learning task until he could correctly 
predict 12 or more of the 16 combinations on a systematic test. Pilot 
testing suggested this learning criterion since working to a criterion of 16 
correct meant some children became uninterested. The children were told 
to learn all the combinations but the task was terminated at the first test on 
which they knew a minimum of 12 of the 16. A child’s prediction on each 
learning or test trial was recorded, and the time spent on each phase of 
learning and testing was recorded. 
After the test on which the child reached criterion, responses to the 
following questions were tape recorded: 
(a) “How did you remember what lights would go on in the big panel? 
Did you have any special ideas or rules which helped you to remember?” 
Follow up questions probed answers to this question. 
(b) “Suppose you have a G light on in your panel (put it on) and you 
want G to stay in the big panel, what would you ask me for? (Y) How did 
you know to ask me for that one?” 
(c) “Suppose you have a G light on in your panel and you want to get R 
in the big panel, what would you ask me for? (B) How did you know to ask 
me for that one?” 
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TABLE 2 
MEAN NUMBER OF CORRECTLY PREDICTED COMBINATIONS ON THE VARIOUS TESTS 
As 
IO 11 12 13 14 
Test I: 10.58 Il.71 11.16 10.48 II.71 
(48)* (48) (44) (48) (4% 
Test 2: 13.86 13.22 12.81 12.87 13.91 
(35) cm (27) (30) m 
Criterion: 14.00 13.44 13.43 13.56 13.96 
(48) (48 (44) (4% (481 
* Numbers in parentheses refer to number of subjects in each group. 
(d) “Suppose you have a R light on in your panel and you want to get B 
in the big panel, what would you ask me for? (R) How did you know to ask 
me for that one?” 
(e) “Suppose you have a B light on in your panel and you want to get R 
in the big panel, what would you ask me for? (G) How did you know to 
ask me for that one?“z 
RESULTS 
Mernury performunce. The Iogic of our procedures required that the 
systematic tests be given to the children when they had learned approxi- 
mately the same number of items. Table 2 shows the mean number of 
items correct on the systematic tests of the 16 combinations. Test 1 
includes each child when given his first test; Test 2 includes each when 
given his second test, for those children given a second test; criterion 
includes each child on the test on which he reached criterion. An Age (5) 
x Sex(2) x School(2) analysis of variance on the data for Test I indicated 
only a main effect of Age [F(4,216) = 3.50, p < .Ol]. Similar analyses 
indicated only a main effect of School on scores at Test 2 [F( 1,216) = 
5.84, p < .051; and an Age x School interaction on scores at criterion 
[F’(4,216) = 4.03, p c .Ol]. 
If children received the systematic tests when they had correctly 
learned the same number of combinations, then the measures of memory 
performance become how many trials and/or how much time it took the 
child to reach this level of performance. However, as the above analyses 
indicate, we were only partially successful in testing every child at the 
same point in learning. Thus, succeeding analyses on the time and trials 
measures were conducted using a covariance analysis, with number cor- 
rect on the relevant test the covariate. We will present only the Test 1 and 
* Details of the questioning procedures can be obtained from the first author. 
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TABLE 3 
DATA FOR TRIALS AND TIME MEASURES 
79 
Trials 
Mean number of trials 
to Test-l 
Means adjusted for 
number 
correct on Test 1 
Mean number of trials 
to criterion 
Means adjusted for 
number 














Mean number of min to 
Test-1 




















* Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations, 
criterion data since on these measures there is data for every child and 
since the Test 2 results are parallel. For Test 1 the performance measures 
were number of trials until the first test and time until the first test: for 
criterion the measures were total number of trials spent in learning (in- 
cluding those on previous tests since these provide valuable learning 
information) and total time spent in learning (including time spent on 
previous tests). Table 3 presents the data for Test 1 and criterion. In each 
case the measures of time and trials are highly correlated (r = .82 for Test 
1: r = .77 for criterion). We will report analyses only on the trials data; 
analyses on the time measures yield essentially the same results. An Age 
(5) x Sex (2) x School (2) covariance analysis on the number of trials for 
Test 1 indicated an Age x School interaction [F(4,215) = 3.73, p < .Ol] 
and a main effect of Age [F(4,215) = 11.51, p < .OOl]. An identical 
analysis on number of trials to criterion indicated an Age x School 
interaction [F(4,215) = 3.81, p c .Ol] and a main effect of Age 
[E’(4,215) = 14.8Y, p =C .OOll. The Age x School interactions are 
accounted for by the fact that 13-year-olds in one school were much better 
than those in the other school. 
As can be seen by the data in Table 3 the Age effect is curvilinear in 
form. A test for curvilinear trend on the trials to Test 1 accounted for a 
significant portion of the Age effect [F(3,215) = 15.16, p C .OOl] with a 
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nonsignificant linear residual [F(l,215) = .62]. A test for curvilinear trend 
on the trials to criterion accounted for a major portion of the Age effect 
[F(3,215) = 18.32, p < .OOl] but in this case there was also a significant 
linear residual [F(l,215) = 4.19, p < .05]. As can be seen in Table 3, 
variances also differed at the different ages: (for trials to Test 1 F max = 
18.71, p < .Ol: for trials to criterion Fmax = 4.64, p < .Ol). 
Sfrutegy reports. Based on the questioning at the end of learning it was 
possible to identify four general strategies which subjects reported using 
to learn the combinations. These four levels essentially represent 
mnemonic devices which subjects had arrived at by the end of learning. 
A. Rote memorization: Subjects responded “I practiced till I knew 
them, I said them to myself,” etc. in response to part (a) of the question- 
ing, and responded “because I remembered them” as explanations in 
parts (b)-(e) of the questioning. 
B. Grouping sets of combinations to facilitate rote memorization: The 
most common groupings reported were: (i) yellow with other colors by a 
statement such as “Y + G = G, Y + B = B, Y + R = R: they’re the easy 
ones;” (ii) the double ones (Y + Y, G + G, B + B, R + R) by a statement 
such as “two of the doubles make yellow and two make blue:” (iii) the six 
combinations of R,B, and G by a statement such as “any two of RBG 
together make the other one except R + G which makes Y” (Note: the 
exception was often overlooked: or (iv) idiosyncratic groupings such as 
“the light ones and dark ones” or “the ones I like best.” Children in this 
category remembered some combinations purely by rote (Level A above) 
and others by combining items to facilitate rote recall. 
C. Discovery of a higher order principle for some subset(s) of the 
combinations: The principles reported were (i) use of the identity element, 
by a statement like “yellow with anything (including itself) leaves it the 
same”: and (ii) use of the commutative principle, by a statement like “it’s 
always the same back to front.” Subjects in this category typically dis- 
covered and used one of these rules: a few discovered both. The remain- 
ing combinations were remembered by rote (as in A above) or by grouping 
(as in B). 
D. Discovery of a higher order system that captured all the combina- 
tions: All the subjects in this classification reported structuring the com- 
binations into the rows and/or columns of the matrix in Table 2. Thus, at 
the least, the subject saw that there was a pattern to the results when each 
light was combined consecutively with all other lights. In addition, almost 
all subjects stated some generalizations about the nature of the pattern. 
These generalizations were almost exclusively of two types. (i) Discovery 
of cyclic operations: The simplest expression of this conceptualization 
was “The answer goes around the panel: with Y it starts at Y, with G it 
starts at G,‘* and so on. More complex versions were expressed in terms 
of cyclic moves: Y moves any light 0, G moves it 1 to the right, B moves it 
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TABLE 4 
NUMBERS OF SUBJECTS REPORTING THE VARIOUS STRATEGIES AT THE DIFFERENT AGES 
10 II 12 13 I4 
A 9 5 13 9 3 
B 21 21 15 18 5 
C 9 13 I3 5 11 
D 3 9 3 IO 29 
2, R moves it 3. (ii) Use of number operations: For example, addition with 
Y = 0, G = 1, I3 = 2, R = 3, as explained before. 
It was possible to classify all subjects into one of these categories.a The 
first author rated all the transcripts. The second author rated a random 
sample of 24 subjects’ transcripts (10% of the total sample). Rater 
reliability (agreements divided by disagreements plus agreements) was 
.88. All disagreements were rated in adjacent categories: (e.g., B by one 
rater, C by the other). 
Table 4 shows the distribution of these strategies over age [x2(12) = 
66.86, p < .OOl]. This table can be best understood by the following three 
partitions. First, there is a significant relationship of strategy type to age if 
subjects using Strategy A are compared to those using all other strategies 
[xX(4) = 10.78,~ < .05]. This effect seems due to the fact that 12-year-olds 
use proportionately more A strategies than children at other ages [x2( 1) for 
A vs other strategies and 12-year-olds vs other ages = 5.54, p < .02]. 
Second, if subjects using Strategy B are compared to those using C or D, 
there is a significant relationship of strategy type to age [x2(4) = 30.57,~~ < 
.OOl]. This effect is due to the fact that 14-year-olds use proportionately 
more C and D strategies than children at the other ages [x2(l) for B vs C 
and D strategies combined and 14-year-olds vs other ages = 23.43, p < 
.OOl]. And third, if subjects using C strategies are compared to those using 
D strategies, there is again a significant strategy type to age relationship 
[x2(4) = 23.25, p < .OOl]. This effect is due to the fact that 13- and 
14-year-olds use more D strategies than the other ages [x2( 1) for 13- and 
14-year-olds combined vs the other ages and for D vs C strategies = 19.47, 
p < .OOl]. 
s The most difficult distinction to make was between a grouping together of combinations 
involving the yellow light, which was merely a mnemonic device (Strategy B): and one 
which indicated that the general identity role of yellow was understood (C). We used as a 
distinguishing feature the fact that children who were grouping together combinations of Y + 
G, Y + B, Y + R as “easy to remember,” failed to add Y + Y to the list. The Y + Y 
combination was most likely to be said to belong to the “double ones,” which were a 
different matter. On the other hand, children who were judged as seeing these combinations 
in terms of the identity role of Y (“The yellow light makes no difference to the light it goes 
with”) applied this rule “even when it goes with itself,” and seemed to see this as a 
necessary part of the system. 
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Relation of strategies and performance. If subjects’ reports at least 
partially reflect their attempts to learn the combinations, strategy reports 
should account for performance. Age (5) x Strategy(4) analyses of 
covariance were performed on both trials to Test 1 and trials to criterion, 
with number correct on Test I and number correct on criterion the 
respective covariates. Because of the significant relation between age and 
strategy reported above the two factors are decidedly nonorthogonal. 
Appelbaum and Cramer’s (1974) procedures for nonorthogonal analyses 
were used. On trials to Test I the analysis indicated no interaction but a 
main effect of Age [F, for Age eliminating Strategy (4,215) = 9.07, p < 
.OOll and a marginal main effect for Strategy [F, for Strategy eliminating 
Age (3,215) = 2.46. p = .06]. The means for Age are reported in Table 3; 
the means for Strategy are: A = 40.21, B = 29.50, C = 27.92, D = 23.06, 
On trials to criterion the analysis indicated a significant Age x Strategy 
interaction [F’(l2,215) = I .83, p < .05J, in addition to main effects for Age 
[F, for Age eliminating Strategy (4,215) = 9.80,~ < .OOl], and for Strategy 
[F, for Strategy eliminating Age (3,215) = 9.16,~ < .OOl]. The means for 
Age are in Table 3 and the means for Strategy are: A = 87.13, B = 67.68, 
C = 62.95, D = 54.02. The Age x Strategy interaction indicates that 
children at the different ages used a strategy with differing degrees of 
success and that this pattern of success differed from strategy to strategy. 
According to Newman-Keuls tests @ < .05) Strategy D produced uni- 
formly good performance at ail ages. When used by the 13-year-olds 
Strategy C produced significantly poorer performance than when used by 
the other ages. With Strategy B, 12-year-olds performed worse than the 
other B-strategy children. Strategy-A produced poorest performance of 
all the strategies at every age, however, in using this strategy I I-, 12-, and 
13-year-olds performed more poorly than lo- and 14-year-olds. 
Performame on untried combimtions. In learning, each child could try 
whichever combinations he wished. Thus, on Test 1 it was possible for 
each child to be tested on (a) combinations he had never tried before in 
learning, (b) combinations tried in learning but never predicted correctly, 
and (c) combinations both tried and predicted correctly (at least once) in 
previous learning. On the average each subject had 4.8 Type A, 3.6 Type 
b, and 7.6 Type c combinations at Test I. Subjects just memorizing ought 
to test poorly on combinations never tried before, since there could be no 
memory of those combinations. Subjects formulating a higher order sys- 
tem need not have seen the combinations to predict them correctly. To 
test this hypothesis the percent correct on Test 1 of c combinations minus 
the percent correct of u combinations was computed for each child. A 
high positive score on this measure indicates better relative performance 
on combinations previously predicted correctIy than on untried combina- 
tions; a lower score indicates better relative performance on untried 
combinations. Seventeen subjects were eliminated because they had no u 
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combinations. An Age (5) x Strategy(4) covariance analysis indicated no 
interaction, no effect of Age, but a significant effect of Strategy [F(3,198) 
= 3.18,~ < .05]. The means for strategy were A = 40.79, B = 34.35, C = 
25.09, D = 21.73, reflecting increasing relative success on the u combina- 
tions going from A to D. (Note: the results are Appelbaum and Cramer’s 
(1974) Pattern 7 of results). 
DISCUSSION 
The results are best discussed as preliminary not definitive findings; the 
research was exploratory in conception, task selection, and procedures. 
A deliberate decision was made to allow subjects the maximum freedom 
of approach consistent with obtaining evidence of learning to a standard 
criterion. This was important in that it enabled subjects to display a rich 
variety of approaches to the problem. It also resulted in a degree of 
imprecision in procedures, especially as related to the timing of the 
systematic tests. In this respect our procedures were imprecise but in- 
formative; in another respect they were precise but surprisingly uninfor- 
mative. Systematic trial by trial records were kept of subjects’ choices of 
combinations for learning the task. These records showed that some 
subjects tested principally items that they already knew the answer to, 
interspersing these gradually with unlearned combinations. Others tested 
only those they were not yet sure of. Neither of these characteristics 
corresponded with developmental patterns of performance on the task or 
with reports at the end of learning. This was also true of more complex 
aspects of the learning records such as the tendency to try a number of 
combinations in succession, all involving one light. Thus, the present 
analysis of strategies relied on the admittedly indirect self-report mea- 
sures obtained at the end of learning. Nevertheless, the data offer a 
developmental picture which seems both promising and reliable. 
There were remarkable differences in the amount of time and the 
number of trials that lo- to 14-year-olds used to achieve memory criterion 
on the task; and there are reasons to believe that these differences reflect 
underlying strategy differences. There is the curvilinear relationship of 
performance to age. It is striking to find older children performing worse 
than younger ones; such data often signal developmental differences in 
method of approaching the task. Also variances increased and then de- 
creased with age. This speaks for heterogenous approaches to the task, at 
the intermediate ages. In addition subjects reported using a variety of 
strategies for remembering the combinations. With increasing age there 
were decreasing reports of rote memorization and increasing reports of 
attempts to remember the combinations indirectly by understanding a 
system from which they could be derived. 
The reported strategies seem to reflect subjects’ approaches to learning 
the task. Given an ideal index of the strategies that were used in learning, 
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the distribution of strategies over age would completely account for the 
age differences in performance. The strategy reports could not be such an 
ideal index. A child may have used a strategy he could not report; a child 
may have been seeking a higher order strategy but then have had to resort 
to a more memorization-like one; a child may have reported a strategy 
discovered late in learning which therefore only partially affected his 
performance. (The last mentioned possibility may account for the fact that 
the strategy factor had a significant effect on trials to criterion but only a 
marginal effect on trials to Test 1). Still, strategy reports were related to 
performance. On trials to criterion there was a main effect of Strategy 
indicating better performance as strategies became less rote 
memorization-like. There was also a Strategy x Age interaction indicating 
a poorer performance of especially those 12- and l3-year-olds who used 
Strategies A,B, and C. However, the strongest evidence of the influence 
of strategies on learning the task comes from analysis of performance on 
untried combinations. The potential benefit of an indirect intentional 
understanding strategy lies in a capacity to infer unseen or unpracticed 
items by deriving them from an understanding of other items. In the Age 
x Strategy analysis of performance on unseen items Strategy was the only 
significant factor; performance consistently increased as strategy reports 
became less memorization-like and more based on understanding. 
The best present interpretation, consistent with these data, seems to be 
that many of the youngest children use a memorization strategy and use it 
fairly efficiently, while the oldest children use a strategy of trying to 
apprehend some system for the items and use it fairly efficiently. Children 
in the middle, especially the 12- and 13-year-olds, seem dissatisfied with 
pure memorization yet are either inefficient in using the more sophisti- 
cated strategy of the 14-year-olds or never discover enough about the task 
to employ it effectively, and so resort to memorization after all. As one 
child put it: “If I worked them all out I wouldn’t have to practice them 
because I’d know them, so it’d be a waste of time; (but) trying to work out 
B + R was a waste of time because I spent a lot of time on it anyway and 
learned it.” 
As hypothesized, employment of a strategy of trying to understand the 
principles of the task as a means of learning the combinations was an 
acquisition of early adolescence, roughly coincident with the onset of 
formal operations. However, this observation requires qualification. In 
the strategy questioning 73 of the 236 children, including 40% of the 
lo-year-olds, explicitly mentioned that at first they thought the lights 
might be like color mixing (“at first I thought Y + R would be orange, I 
thought it had to be colors they’d make not on the panel but with real 
paints”). This approach is clearly distinguishable from the 14-year-old’s 
attemgt to derive a new system appropriate only to the present task. Color 
mixing provides a familiar, practiced, previously remembered set of in- 
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formation which is concretely similar to the present stimuli (both involve 
combinations of colors). On the other hand, numbers, or moves around a 
circle, are not perceptually inherent in the stimuli and their use necessi- 
tates the tailoring of more general ideas to fit this particular problem. In 
spite of these differences, an attempt to predict the combinations in terms 
of color mixing represents an important step toward a strategy of deliber- 
ate understanding. These responses indicate that use of an intentional but 
indirect understanding strategy could profitably be studied with younger 
children, and that the beginnings of this development are likely to lie in 
cases of provoked, unmodified, yet deliberate assimilation of new infor- 
mation to old. 
A number of recent studies with children and adults (Bransford & 
Franks, 1972: Brown, 1975: Paris & Carter, 1973) have shown that ap- 
prehension of general principles or prototypes leads subjects to remember 
old previously seen instances and also “remember” or infer new previ- 
ously unseen but valid instances. These studies have been based on spon- 
taneous, naturally occurring comprehension of prototypes or general 
representations. In contrast the present study focused on children’s delib- 
erate attempts to generate such representations as a means of remembering 
items. Thus, the basic cognitive phenomenon of interest is similar but we 
wished to examine subjects’ understanding and exploitation of this phe- 
nomenon for their own ends. The present results, while requiring exten- 
sion with other tasks and younger subjects, suggest that some time after 
the child becomes aware of the efficacy of rote memory strategies he 
further appreciates that recall of specific items may be achieved by deriva- 
tion from a general conceptualization. 
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